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part of the aircraft carrier strike group's operational capability.
Thus, the sortie and recovery capability the carrier-borne air-
crafts is one of the core technical indexes that the designers
should concern (Michini and How, 2011; Zheng et al., 2013).
Most of the aircraft guarantee work takes place on the flight
deck (Ryan et al., 2011). However, if the flight deck is
attacked by anti-ship weapons especially the missiles with
cluster warheads, some key aircraft guarantee resources may
be destroyed and this will weaken the flight deck's working
ability greatly. If the aircraft carrier loses the sortie and re-
covery capability due to the damage of its flight deck, it has to* Corresponding author.
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ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).retreat from the battle, even if its hull is intact. Therefore, the
flight deck can be seen as one of the aircraft carrier's weak
points.
With the help of the simulative method, the research work
of this paper mainly aims to find out the flight deck's resistance
to the anti-ship missiles with cluster warheads and the rela-
tionship between the damage of the flight deck and the aircraft
carrier's residual operational capability.1.2. Related literature and theory
1.2.1. The method for evaluating the warship's survivability
The survivability is an important part of a warship's combat
effectiveness (Rains, 1994; Vassalos, 1999). To take the un-
certainty into consideration, a warship's survivability contains
2 aspects and they are the susceptibility and the vulnerability
(Ball, 1985). The former one concerns the probability that the
warship being detected and hit by the enemy's weapons while
the latter one concerns the damage degree caused by the
enemy's weapons (Ball, 1994).hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
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carrier-borne aircrafts and other surface combat ships in the
strike group. Before the enemy's anti-ship missiles have the
chance to reach the aircraft carrier, they have to penetrate 3
defense zones respectively constructed by the intercept fire-
power of the carrier-borne aircrafts, the guided missile de-
stroyers and the terminal defense weapons onboard the aircraft
carrier (Sun, 2000). Thus, the susceptibility of the flight deck
is mainly represented by the probability that the enemy's
missiles escape and penetrate through the 3 defense zones and
the positions that being hit by the warheads.
Traditionally, the vulnerability of a warship mainly in-
cludes the damage degree of the devices onboard and the
floodability (Reese and Calvano, 1998; Said, 1995). In this
paper, the vulnerability refers to the damage degree of the
aircraft guarantee resources on the flight deck. There exist a
number of methods and theories that can be applied to
quantifying the combined influence of the subsystems' dam-
age degree to the decline of the warship's operational capa-
bility (Wasmund, 2001), including the fault tree analysis (Shu
et al., 2006) and the network theory (Albert et al., 2000;
Albert and Barabasi, 2002) which are being broadly used.
In this paper, instead of other methods, the sortie generation
rate is calculated to express the aircraft carrier's residual
operational capability, since it is more ocular than any other
indexes.
1.2.2. The method for calculating the sortie generation rate
The process of the carrier-borne aircrafts' sortie and recovery
can be modeled with the closed queuing network (Dietz and
Jerkins, 1997; Dastidar and Frazzoli, 2011), which should be
non-preemptive and multi-class. The analytic solution of this
closed queuing network can be gained by the Mean Value
Analysis (MVA) (Bryant et al., 1984; Akyildiz and Gunter,
1988), in the condition that the model has to be properly
simplified and leave out some constraints (Reiser, 1979).
Therefore, though this method is fast and precise enough in
some degree, it can't take all actual conditions into consider-
ation. The simulative methods are conservative and slow, but
much more precise than the analytic ones (Harris, 2002). As a
result, in this paper, the Monte Carlo method is applied to
solving the sortie generation rate as the residual operational
capability.
2. The model of survivability evaluation for the flight deck2.1. The susceptibility evaluationThe susceptibility evaluation in this paper aims to calculate
the probabilities of every part of the aircraft carrier's flight
deck and the aircraft guarantee resources on it to be hit by
enemy's anti-ship warheads, when the whole strike group is
performing an anti-air combat mission. The calculation con-
tains 2 steps. One is to calculate the penetration probability of
the enemy's anti-ship missiles when they fly across the defense
system constructed by both the carrier-borne fighters and
surface combat ships of the strike group. The other is thedetermination of the position where the warheads are to hit
when these warheads break through the defense.
2.1.1. Calculation the penetration probability
The process of enemy's anti-ship missiles penetrating
through the 3 defense zones of the strike group can be
modeled by the queuing theory. 2 kinds of queuing systems are
used to calculate the penetration probability.
(1) The mixed M/M/c/∞ queue with limited time for waiting
Since the depths of the outer and mid defense zones are
relatively large, it takes a relatively long time for enemy's anti-
ship missiles to fly through. Therefore, the penetration prob-
ability can be calculated with the help of the model of the
mixed M/M/c/∞ queue with limited time for waiting. In this
model, the process of penetration and interception can be
taken as the customers waiting in a queue and being served by
a number of servers. Therein, these incoming missiles are like
the customers while the firepower passages of the strike group
are like the servers. Thus, the situation that the enemy's anti-
ship missiles don't encounter any interception during their
flying across the current defense zone and succeed in pene-
trating caused by the saturation of the intercept firepower
means the customer abandon the service and leave the queue
due to waiting for too long.
For a certain defense zone, it is assumed that df and dc
respectively represent the far boundary and close boundary of
the carrier-borne fighters or the regional air defense missiles'
operational distance and the number of the intercept firepower
passages is c. The incoming enemy's anti-ship missiles subject
to the Poisson stream with the intensity of l and their flying
speed is ve. If enemy's missiles succeed in penetration due to
the saturation of the intercept firepower, the time that they
spend in flying across the defense zone is te. Then, the pene-
tration intensity of one single missile can be written as
follows:
n¼ 1
te
¼ 1
df  dc

ve
ð1Þ
The intercept operation generally includes detecting the
targets, preparing to launch the interceptor missiles and the
missiles flying towards the targets until them hitting or missing
the targets. As ta is assumed to be the service time, which
means the time that needed to complete this operation, the
average service rate of the intercept firepower in the current
defense zone can be written as follows:
m¼ cms ¼
c
ta
ð2Þ
In this equation, ms ¼ 1=ta means the average service rate
of one single intercept firepower passage.
Let N(t) be the number of incoming enemy's anti-ship mis-
siles and the transition probability can be written as follows:
pijðDtÞ ¼ P
n
NðtþDtÞ ¼ jjNðtÞ¼i
o
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pijðDtÞ¼
8><
>:
lDtþoðDtÞ; j¼ iþ1;i0
imDtþoðDtÞ; j¼ i1;i¼1;2;…;c
½cmþðicÞnDtþoðDtÞ; j¼ i1;i¼cþ1;cþ2;…
oðDtÞ; ji jj2
ð3Þ
Then, fNðtÞ; t  0g is the birth and death process of
E ¼ f0; 1; 2;…g, in which exists the following equation:
li ¼ l; i 0; mi ¼

im; 1 i c
cmþ ði cÞn; i> c ð4Þ
This birth and death process has the steady equilibrium
solution and if let t/∞, the equilibrium equation set can be
gained as follows:8<
:
lp0 ¼ mp1
ðlþ imÞpi ¼ lpi1 þ ðiþ 1Þmpiþ1; i¼ 1;2;…;c 1
½lþ cmþ ði cÞnpi ¼ lpi1 þ ½cmþ ði cþ 1Þnpiþ1; i¼ c;cþ 1; cþ 2;…
ð5ÞBased on this equation, the expression of pi can be educed
as follows:
pi ¼
8>>>><
>>>:
li
i!mi
p0; i¼ 1;2;…; c
li
c!mc
Yic
k¼1
ðcmþ knÞ
p0; i¼ cþ 1;cþ 2;…
ð6Þ
Considering that
P∞
i¼0pi ¼ 1;, p0 can be expressed as
follows:
p0 ¼ 1Pc
i¼0
li
i!mi
þP∞i¼cþ1 li
c!mc
Yic
k¼1
ðcmþ knÞ
ð7Þ
Thus, the probabilities of the queuing system at every state
can be easily calculated.
Nq ¼ E

Nq
¼ X∞
i¼cþ1
ði cÞpi ð8Þ
As the incoming intensity of the enemy's anti-ship missiles
is l and the penetration intensity of one single missile is n, the
penetration probability caused by the saturation of the inter-
cept firepower can be expressed as follows:P'e ¼
Nqn
l
¼ n
l
2
664 X
∞
i¼cþ1
ði cÞli
c!mc
Yic
k¼1
ðcmþ knÞ
3
775p0 ð9Þ
Considering that the hit rate of the intercept firepower
cannot be as high as 100%, the enemy's anti-ship missiles
encountered by the intercept firepower still has the chance to
penetrate due to the interceptor missiles launched by the
carrier-borne fighters or surface combat ships missing the
target. Let pa be the hit rate of every intercept firepower pas-
sage and considering all the factors above, the resultant
penetration probability of the current defense zone can be
written as follows:Pe ¼ P'e þ

1P'e
ð1 paÞ ð10Þ
After the intercept operation of the current defense zone,
the incoming intensity of the enemy's anti-ship missiles de-
creases to Pel.
(2) The M/M/c/c queue with loss system
Different from the outer and mid defense zones, consisting
of rapid-fire Gatling guns or other similar weapons, though the
intercept firepower of the terminal defense zone has shorter
response time and shooting period (usually shorter than 5s),
the depth of this defense zone is much smaller. Additionally,
as the enemy's anti-ship missiles will accelerate to a very high
speed (faster than 3Ma) and change the trajectory, there isn't
much time for the intercept firepower to perform the intercept
operation. Once the intercept firepower passages are saturated
at the same time the enemy's anti-ship missiles enter the cur-
rent defense zone, the latter ones will successfully penetrate
immediately. Thus, the combat process of penetration and
interception in the terminal defense zone can be modeled by
the M/M/c/c queue with loss system, which means the cus-
tomers cannot bear any time for waiting if they don't receive
the service immediately when they reach the service window.
It is assumed that the enemy's anti-ship missiles change its
speed to vt, so the time that these missiles spend flying through
the current defense zone can be written as follows:
tt ¼ df  dc
vt
ð11Þ
As there is no customer in the queue, the queuing system
has finite number of states and this number is cþ1. So the
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expressed as follows:8<
:
lp0 ¼ mp1
ðlþ imÞpi ¼ lpi1 þ ðiþ 1Þpiþ1; i¼ 1;2;…;c 1
cmpc ¼ lpc1
ð12Þ
Then, pi can be educed as follows:
pi ¼ l
i
i!mi
p0; i¼ 0;1;2;…;c ð13Þ
Considering that
P∞
i¼0pi ¼ 1, p0 can be expressed as
follows:
p0 ¼ 1Pc
i¼0
li
i!mi
ð14Þ
Due to the inference above, the penetration probability that
the enemy's anti-ship missiles don't encounter the interception
can be written as follows:
P'e ¼ pc ¼
lc
c!mc
p0 ð15Þ
In the terminal defense zone, the enemy's anti-ship missiles
being intercepted also has the chance to escape and penetrate
since the rapid-fire Gatling guns may miss the target either.
For this kind of weapons, like the 730-Guns, the hit rate of one
single gun can be determined by the empirical formula shown
as follows:
pa ¼ 1

1 pas
u
	ngtt ð16Þ
In this equation, pas is the hit rate of one single shot; u is
the average least number of the shells hit on every enemy's
anti-ship missile to insure the destruction of the latter one; ng
is the firing rate of one single gun.Fig. 1. The change of the penetration probabiIn summary, the resultant penetration probability of ene-
my's anti-ship missiles in the current defense zone can be
expressed as follows:
Pe ¼ P'e þ

1P'e
ð1 paÞ ð17Þ
(3) The calculation of the penetration probability.
Let Pe1, Pe2, Pe3 respectively represent the penetration
probabilities when the enemy's anti-ship missiles successively
fly through the outer, mid and terminal defense zones of the
carrier strike group. Thus, the overall penetration probability
for the enemy's anti-ship missiles' penetrating into the strike
group and threatening the aircraft carrier can be represented in
the form of product which is shown as follows:
Pe ¼ Pe1$Pe2$Pe3 ð18Þ
From the calculation model of Pe1~Pe3 above, it can be
inferred that among all the parameters, ve and l have the
strongest influence on the value of Pe in the precondition that
the military strength of the carrier strike group is certain. To
analyze the degree of their influence, the calculating data are
shown in Fig. 1, when the value of ve and l varies at a certain
extent.
From the data points and curves in Fig. 1, it is very clear
that Pe increases obviously with the increase of ve. When l is
less than 14 min1, there are enough intercept firepower
passages available to deal with the incoming enemy's anti-ship
missiles, which causes that Pe hardly increases. When l is
larger than 14 min1, with the increase of the saturation
probability of the intercept firepower, Pe increases much
faster. Consequently, it can be inferred that improving the anti-
ship missiles' flying speed and using the tactic of saturation
attack will greatly add to the difficulty for the carrier strike
group to defend.lity, Pe, with different values of ve and l.
567F. Yang et al. / International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering 8 (2016) 563e5762.1.2. Simulation of the hit positions
Once the enemy's anti-ship missiles escape from the inter-
ception and succeed in penetrating through the 3 defense
zones of the strike group, they will have the chance to hit on
the aircraft carrier's flight deck. As it is assumed that enemy
equips their anti-ship missiles with the cluster warheads, the
hit positions of both the missiles and the warheads carried by
them should be considered and calculated.
(1) The flight deck-plate modeling
The concept of the flight deck-plate (FP) relates the
workflows of the sortie and recovery operation with the gen-
eral layout designs of the flight deck. The concrete method is
that the whole flight deck of the aircraft carrier is divided into
a quantity of squares with the same length of sides. These
squares are numbered by their positions and any one of them is
just a “flight deck-plate”, which reflects the idea of dis-
cretization. When considering the position of any aircraft
guarantee resources, there is no need to calculate its exact
coordinates while knowing which FP it is in is enough. Thus,
the amount of calculation is reduced. For example, when
analyzing the survivability of a heavy aircraft carrier's flight
deck (Norman, 1983), to ensure the computational accuracy
while improving the efficiency, the coordinate system of O-xy
can be established as shown in Fig. 2 and the flight deck can be
divided into 80 FPs whose side is as long as 16 m.
Since the aircraft guarantee resources are distributed in all of
the FPs, the degree of reduction of the aircraft carrier's operational
capability will be different when the warheads hit the different
FPs. When a specific FP is hit, whether the aircraft guarantee
resources on it will be hit depends on a set of probabilities which
are related to the shapes and sizes of these aircraft guarantee re-
sources. What's more, the damage of some key FPs like the ones
with the island or arresting wires on them will cause the opera-
tional capability greatly decline or even decline to 0.
(2) The hit positions of the anti-ship missiles
It is assumed that the position that every anti-ship missile
aims at is the coordinate origin in Fig. 2 and the actual hitFig. 2. The general view of the Fposition obeys the 2-dimensional normal distribution taking
the coordinate origin as central. The probability density
function can be expressed as follows:
f ðx;yÞ¼ 1
2psxsy
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 r2
p exp
 
 1
2ð1 r2Þ
"
x2
sx2
2rxy
sxsy
þ y
2
sy2
#!
ð19Þ
In this equation, sx and sy respectively represent the stan-
dard deviations of x and y, and sx > 0, sy > 0; r represents the
correlation coefficient of x and y, and 0jrj<1.
As x and y are mutually independent, r ¼ 0 and the Eq. (19)
can be simplified as follows:
f ðx; yÞ ¼ 1
2psxsy
exp
 
 1
2
"
x2
sx2
þ y
2
sy2
#!
ð20Þ
Thus, the actual hit positions of the anti-ship missiles
represented by (xm, ym) can be calculated with the equation
shown as follows:
xm ¼ sx
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2 lnnm1
p
cosð2pnm2Þ
ym ¼ sy
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2 lnnm1
p
sinð2pnm2Þ
; nm1 ¼ rand; nm2 ¼ rand
ð21Þ
(3) The hit positions of the warheads
The number of warheads that every enemy's anti-ship
missile carriers is Nz. When a missile is approaching the
aircraft carrier, it will explode above the flight deck and throw
out all the warheads. It is assumed that the hit positions of
these warheads are independent and each of them obey the
uniform distribution in the circular area which takes the mis-
sile's hit position as the circle center. The radius of this circular
area is assumed to be Rs, so the hit positions of the warheads
carried by a single missile can be expressed as follows:

xz ¼ xm þ nz1Rs cos½ð2nz2  1Þp
yz ¼ ym þ nz1Rs sin½ð2nz2  1Þp ; nz1 ¼ rand; nz2 ¼ rand
ð22ÞPs of a heavy aircraft carrier.
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contrast to the coordinate intervals of every FP, the FPs being
hit and damaged can easily be found. Based on this, the
damage degree of the aircraft guarantee resources on the flight
deck can be solved with the help of vulnerability evaluation
method which will be presented in the following context.2.2. The vulnerability evaluationThe vulnerability evaluation in this paper mainly considers
the survivability of the aircraft guarantee resources and the
residual effectiveness of every workflow of the sortie and re-
covery operations on the flight deck. The workflows of the
sortie and recovery operations for the carrier-borne aircrafts
includes landing, fault checking, maintaining, refueling, relo-
cating, rearming, catapulting to launch, and performing mili-
tary tasks. To complete any of these workflows, multiple kinds
of aircraft guarantee resources will be employed. Thus, the
damage of the aircraft guarantee resources will weaken the
effectiveness of the workflows of the sortie and recovery op-
erations. All of the aircraft guarantee resources on the flight
deck and their identifiers are shown in the following table.
2.2.1. The residual functions of the aircraft guarantee
resources
The concept of insurance degree is applied to quantifica-
tionally representing the residual functions of the aircraft
guarantee resources when the flight deck is hit by enemy's
warheads. The value of an insurance degree is between 0 and
1, where 0 means totally destroyed while 1 means intact.
Considering the concrete conditions of these aircraft guarantee
resources in Table 1, the insurance degree of them will be
calculated with different forms of functions.
(1) The “0e1” damage type
Some special devices on the flight deck are weakly pro-
tected while their physical constructions are complicated.
Thus, once any one of them is hit by a single enemy's warhead,
it will completely lose its working ability and the insurance
degree will decline to 0. This kind of aircraft guaranteeTable 1
The aircraft guarantee resources on the flight deck.
Identifier Aircraft guarantee resources Identifier Aircraft g
1 Catapult 1 15 Optical la
2 Catapult 2 16 Landing
3 Catapult 3 17 Island
4 Catapult 4 18 Refueling
5 Arresting wire 1 19 Refueling
6 Arresting wire 2 20 Refueling
7 Arresting wire 3 21 Refueling
8 Arresting wire 4 22 Refueling
9 Flight elevator 1 23 Refueling
10 Flight elevator 2 24 Relocatin
11 Flight elevator 3 25 Relocatin
12 Flight elevator 4 26 Relocatin
13 Parking area 27 Relocatin
14 Landing strip 28 Relocatinresources includes the catapults, arresting wires, flight eleva-
tors, optical landing assistant device, landing assistant radar
and jet blast deflectors. Their insurance degree functions can
be expressed as follows:
siðxÞ ¼

0; n 1
1; n¼ 0 ; i¼ 1;2;…;12;15;16;38;39;…;41
ð23Þ
In this equation, n represents the number of enemy's war-
heads that hit the aircraft guarantee resource; the corner mark,
i, corresponds to the identifiers in Table 1.
(2) The parking area and the island
The parking area covers almost 35% of the flight deck area,
which is the main activity place of the carrier-borne aircrafts
on the flight deck and is the work place of the refueling,
rearming, maintaining and relocating teams. The island is the
important command module of the aircraft carrier with many
electronic instruments and command cabins in it. Both of these
2 kinds of aircraft guarantee take up relatively large area or
volumes or have some protection. So they can sustain the hit
from a number of warheads in some extent. Their insurance
degree functions can be established by the drop half-ridge
distribution function, expressed as follows:
siðnÞ ¼
8>><
>>:
1; n¼ 0
1
2
 1
2
sin
p
Ni

nNi
2

; 0<n<Ni; i¼ 13;17
0; n Ni
ð24Þ
In this equation, N13 and N17 respectively represent the
largest number of warheads that the parking area and the is-
land can sustain being hit and their values are different.
(3) The landing strip
The landing strip locates in the angled area of the flight
deck. Though it occupies quite a bit area, as the aircrafts areuarantee resources Identifier Aircraft guarantee resources
nding assistant device 29 Rearming team 1
assistant radar 30 Rearming team 2
31 Rearming team 3
team 1 32 Rearming team 4
team 2 33 Maintenance team 1
team 3 34 Maintenance team 2
team 4 35 Maintenance team 3
team 5 36 Maintenance team 4
team 6 37 Maintenance team 5
g team 1 38 Jet blast deflector 1
g team 2 39 Jet blast deflector 2
g team 3 40 Jet blast deflector 3
g team 4 41 Jet blast deflector 4
g team 5
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forming the landing operation, even a relatively small area of
damage may lead to the unavailability of the landing strip. So,
its insurance degree function can be written as follows:
s14ðnÞ ¼
8<
:
1; n¼ 0
0:25; n¼ 1
0; n 2
ð25Þ
(4) The guarantee teams on the flight deck
The refueling, rearming, maintaining or relocating teams
usually consist of some support crews and the relevant guar-
antee devices. Their guarantee work takes place in the parking
area, but their positions are not fixed. Thus, it is assumed that
the probabilities that they being hit are the functions of s13. As
these guarantee teams lack of any kind protection, if any one
of them is hit by a single enemy's warhead, its insurance de-
gree will decline to 0. Their insurance degree functions can be
expressed as follows:
siðnÞ ¼ siðs13ðnÞÞ ¼

0; k> s13ðnÞ
1; k  s13ðnÞ
; k ¼ rand;
i¼ 18;19;…;37
ð26Þ
(5) The carrier-borne aircrafts
When the enemy's warheads hit the flight deck, they will do
damage to the carrier-borne aircrafts on the flight deck, too. In
this paper, it is assumed that the number of the residual carrier-
borne aircrafts is proportional to s13, the value of the insurance
degree of the parking area.
2.2.2. The residual effectiveness of the sortie and recovery
operations
The residual effectiveness of the workflows of the sortie
and recovery operations can also be represented by the in-
surance degree and it can be expressed as the functions of
s1~s41. One thing is for sure that if the island is damage, the
effectiveness of most of the workflows will be negatively
affected.
(1) The landing
A conventional mono hull aircraft carrier usually has a
single landing strip. Only a single carrier-borne aircraft is
permitted to perform the landing operation at one time. The
effectiveness of this workflow relates to the residual functions
of the landing strip, arresting wires and the landing assistant
radar. Thus, the insurance degree functions can be expressed
as follows:
ss1 ¼ s5 þ s6 þ s7 þ s8
4
$s14$

1
4
s15 þ 3
4
s16

$

1
2
þ 1
2
s17

ð27Þ(2) The fault checking
As the workload of the fault checking for carrier-borne
aircrafts is relatively small and it also takes up little aircraft
guarantee resources, it is assumed that the effectiveness of this
workflow won't be affected by the status of the flight deck and
its insurance degree is fixed to be 1.
ss2 ¼ 1 ð28Þ
(3) The maintaining
The effectiveness of maintaining operation is related to the
status of not only the maintenance teams, but also the flight
elevators, as in some particular situations the latter ones may
transport the faulted or maintained aircrafts between the flight
deck and the hanger. There are 5 maintenance teams on the
flight deck and 5 aircrafts can be being maintained by them at
one time. The insurance degree functions of the maintaining
operations can be expressed as follows:
ss3i ¼

1
2
þ s9 þ s10 þ s11 þ s12
8

$

1
2
þ 1
2
s17

$siþ32; i
¼ 1;2;…;5 ð29Þ
(4) The refueling, rearming and relocating
There are 6 refueling teams, 4 rearming teams and 5 relo-
cating teams on the flight deck. Thus, the insurance degree
functions of the related workflows can be expressed as
follows:
ss4i ¼

1
2
þ 1
2
s17

$siþ17; i¼ 1;2;…;6 ð30Þ
ss6i ¼

1
2
þ 1
2
s17

$siþ28; i¼ 1;2;…;4 ð31Þ
ss7i ¼ ss5i ¼

1
2
þ 1
2
s17

$siþ23; i¼ 1;2;…;5 ð32Þ
(5) The catapulting
It should be noticed that a heavy aircraft usually has 4
catapults but only 3 of them can perform the workflow of
catapulting at one time. The effectiveness of catapulting is
related to the status of the jet blast deflector and catapults.
Therefore, the insurance degree functions of the workflow of
catapulting can be expressed as follows:
ss9i ¼

1
2
þ 1
2
s17

$si$siþ37; i¼ 1;2;3;4 ð33Þ
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aircrafts sortie and recoveryBased on the analysis in former sections and some relevant
references, the workflows of the carrier-borne aircrafts sortie
and recovery operations can be simulated by a non-preemptive
multi-class closed queuing network with shared service win-
dows, which is shown in Fig. 3.
In this queuing network, the aircrafts on different tasks are
set to be in different priority classes. The aircrafts in the same
priority class receive the service according to the order that
they arrived at the service station, while the aircraft in higher
priority class receives the service in advance of those in lower
priority class. The exceptional case is that the faulted aircrafts
should perform the landing operation earlier than the intact
ones. The 2 relocating service stations share the same relo-
cating teams, which are the only shared service windows in
this network. All the available carrier-borne aircrafts are
usually divided into 3e5 squadrons and every squadron's
timing for sortie is arranged in front of the combat.3.2. The assumption of the service timeAs a matter of experience, the service time is usually
assumed to subject to the normal distribution or negative
exponential distribution.
The service time of refueling, rearming and performing
military tasks subjects to the normal distribution, shown as
follows:
f ðtÞ ¼

l$expð  ms$tÞ; t  0
0; t<0
ð34Þ
The service time of other service stations subjects to the
negative exponential distribution, shown as follows:Fig. 3. Illustration of the closed queuing networkf ðtÞ ¼
8><
>:
1
ss$
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p $exp
"
 ðt msÞ
2
2s2s
#
; t  0
0; t<0
ð35Þ
In Eqs. (33) and (34), ms is the average service rate of any
service station. While the residual effectiveness of the work-
flows is considered, the actual value of the average service rate
can be expressed as follows:
m's ¼ ss$ms ð36Þ
In this equation, ss is just the insurance degree which can be
calculated with the vulnerability evaluation model in former
sections.
In this closed queuing network, if any one of the service
stations' effectiveness declines to 0, the customers as the air-
crafts cannot circularly flow in the network. Thus, the sortie
generation rate declines to 0, which causes the aircraft carrier
lose the operational capability.
4. Case study and discussions4.1. The input parametersThe strike group includes 1 heavy aircraft carrier and 6
destroyers.
The available aircrafts on the carrier's flight deck are 2
AEWs and 36 fighters. Each of the 2 AEWs uses the 1 þ 15
triple-cycles. The fighters are divided into 3 squadrons and the
1 þ 15 single-cycles are employed (Zheng et al., 2013; James
and Harris, 2002), which means there are always 12 fighters
ready for interception in the outer defense zone. Every fighter
carries 3 short-range anti-air missiles as the interceptor
missiles.
The destroyers equipped with the regional air defense
missiles provide the intercept firepower of the mid defense
zone. Each of the destroyers has 8 firepower passages. The 2of carrier-borne aircrafts sortie and recovery.
Table 2
Parameters of the defense zones.
Defense zone Launch platform Interceptor c df (km) dc (km) ta (min) pa/pas u ng (min
1)
Outer Carrier-borne fighters Short-range anti-air missiles 36 400 185 75 0.95 y y
Mid Guided missile destroyers Regional air defense missiles 48 185 5 1 0.6 y y
Terminal Rapid-fire guns Armor-piercing shells 2 5 0 0.167 0.0094 2.67 4000
Table 4
The parameters of the incoming enemy's anti-ship missiles.
ve (Ma) vt (Ma) l (min
1) sx (m) sy (m)
2 6 24 60 20
Fig. 4. The change of the frequency of penetration with different number of
incoming missiles.
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firepower of the terminal defense zone.
Thus, the concrete settings of the 3 defense zones are
shown in Table 2.
Based on the data in Angelyn's reports (1998a,b), the initial
settings of the service stations when 1 þ 15 cycle is employed
are shown in Table 3. It is assumed that the Mean Time Be-
tween Failures (MTBF) of all the carrier-borne aircraft is 4 h.
The settings of the enemy's anti-ship missiles are shown in
Table 4.
When calculating the sortie generation rate, the total work
time is set to be 18 h. The situations of 4, 8, 12, 16, 24, 32, 48,
64, 96 and 128 enemy's anti-ship missiles incoming are
considered. The Monte Carlo method (Cornebise, 2009;
Andrieu, 2010) is applied to solving the result and the simu-
lative computation will be circulated for 2000 times to
calculate the sortie generation rate. To save the time expense,
if the flight deck is intact in the current loop, instead of
continuing the remaining calculation of this loop, based on the
data collected in previous research, the sortie generation rate is
estimated by generating a random number which obeys the
normal distribution, N (120, 7.96).4.2. The simulation result and discussion
4.2.1. The probability of being hit
To analyze the probability that the flight deck being hit of
each simulative situation, Fig. 4 shows the frequency that at
least one enemy's anti-ship missile succeeds in penetrating;
Fig. 5 shows the detailed data of the number of the penetrated
missiles. From Fig. 4, it can be inferred that the probability
that the carrier being hit by at least one missile rises very
quickly with the increase of the number of the incoming
enemy's anti-ship missiles. Thanks to the intercept firepowerTable 3
Parameters of the service stations.
Identifier Name Number of
service windows
ms (min
1) ss (min
1)
AEW Fighter AEW Fighter
1 Landing 1 53 53 y y
2 Fault checking þ∞ 20 20 y y
3 Maintaining 5 0.56 0.56 y y
4 Refueling 6 3.33 2.4 0.4 0.4
5 Relocating (a) 5 20 20 y y
6 Rearming 4 y 3 y 0.3
7 Relocating (b) 5 17 17 y y
8 On standby þ∞ y y y y
9 Catapulting 3 30 30 y y
10 Performing tasks þ∞ 0.23 0.48 0.5 0.5of the 3 defense zones, this probability is relatively small when
there are less than 8 missiles incoming. However, when there
are more than 24 missiles incoming, the probability is at least
as large as 80%.
From Fig. 5, it can be inferred that the average of the
penetrated missiles is roughly in proportion to the number of
incoming missiles. Thus, from both of these 2 figures, it can be
concluded that the tactic of saturation attack is very effective
in guarantee the penetration probability even the interceptFig. 5. The change of the number of penetrated missiles with different number
of incoming missiles.
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the penetration probability rises, under the attack of the mis-
siles with cluster warheads, the aircraft carrier's flight deck can
hardly keep intact.
4.2.2. The damage of the service stations
In the closed queuing network of the carrier-borne aircrafts
sortie and recovery, apart from the 3 service stations of fault
checking, standing by and performing military tasks which
don't rely on the aircraft guarantee resources, the frequencies
of each service station being hit and being destroyed are
shown in Figs 6e11.
From the blue round data points in Fig. 6, it can be seen that
the 2 service stations of landing and maintaining are the mostFig. 7. The frequencies of maintaining station being hit and being destroyed.
Fig. 8. The frequencies of refueling station being hit and being destroyed.
Fig. 6. The frequencies of landing station being hit and being destroyed.likely to be destroyed. This is mainly because that the area of
the landing strip is relatively large, which adds to the proba-
bility of being hit by the warheads. At the same time, the
insurance degree of the service station of maintaining is
relevant to those of the 4 flight elevators, which also increases
the probability of being hit. By contrast, though the area of the
parking area is even larger than that of the landing strip and it
occupies nearly 2/3 of the flight deck, as the positions of the
refueling, rearming and relocation teams are not fixed, when
the number of incoming enemy's anti-ship missiles is relatively
small, the service stations of refueling, rearming and reloca-
tion are not so frequently to be hit by the warheads. With more
missiles incoming, the gaps between the frequencies of each
service station being hit become smaller. When the incomingFig. 9. The frequencies of relocating station being hit and being destroyed.
Fig. 10. The frequencies of rearming station being hit and being destroyed.
Fig. 11. The frequencies of catapulting station being hit and being destroyed.
Fig. 13. The degree of integrity of maintaining service station.
Fig. 14. The degree of integrity of refueling service station.
Fig. 15. The degree of integrity of relocating service station.
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are roughly in the same order of magnitude.
According to the red triangular data points in Fig. 6, the 2
service stations of landing and catapulting are the most likely
to be destroyed. As any service station being destroyed and
losing its insurance degree will cause the sortie generation rate
declining to 0, it can be deduced that these 2 service stations
are the weakness of the entire closed queuing network.
Compared with them, other service stations have relatively
more chances to survive during the combat. As long as the
insurance degree of the parking area is larger than 0, the
aircraft guarantee teams always have the activity space and
still have some working abilities.
Furthermore, the concept of integrity is introduced to
measure the damage degree of these 6 service stations and it
can be calculated by the following equation:
DIðiÞ ¼
PM
j¼1 m
ði;jÞ
s
Mm
ðiÞ
s
; i¼ 1;3;4;5;6;7;9 ð37Þ
where the corner mark i indicates the ith service station and j
indicates the jth service window of that service station; m
ðiÞ
s
represents the service rate of the service windows in the ith
service station which hasM service windows in total, when the
service station is intact; m
ði;jÞ
s represents the service rate of the
jth service window in the ith service station. The change of the
degree of integrity with different number of incoming missiles
is shown in Fig. 12e17.
The figures above indicate that the trends of the decline of
these curves differ at a certain extent. The curves in Figs. 12
and 13 are similar and their decline trends are approximately
linear. This is mainly because the insurance degrees of landing
and maintaining service station are respectively related to that
of the arresting wires and flight elevators, whose calculation
modes are the same as Eq. (23). The curves in Figs. 14e16 are
very close to each other too, as the insurance degrees of the
aircraft guarantee teams are the function of that of the parking
area, expressed as Eq. (26). When there are less than16 ene-
my's anti-ship missiles incoming, their insurance degrees
decline very slow. This is mainly because the parking area is
relatively large and only a few warheads hitting on it can
hardly weaken its insurance degree. Comparatively speaking,
the curve in Fig. 17 declines much faster and when there areFig. 12. The degree of integrity of landing service station. Fig. 16. The degree of integrity of rearming service station.
Fig. 17. The degree of integrity of catapulting service station. Fig. 19. The change of the average of the residual aircrafts with the different
number of incoming missiles.
Fig. 20. The change of the average of the sortie generation rates with the
different number of incoming missiles.
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integrity of catapulting service station is less than 0.2. This is
mainly because the 4 catapults are very easy to be hit and
destroyed by enemy's warheads.
4.2.3. The decline of the sortie and recovery capability
4 representative indexes are chosen to quantificationally
evaluate the impact on the sortie and recovery capability,
showing in Fig. 18e21, which includes the average of the
damaged FPs, the average of the residual aircrafts, the average
of the sortie generation rate, and the frequency that the aircraft
carrier lose the operational capability. Therein, the situation
that the aircraft carrier loses the operational capability in-
dicates that the sortie generation rate is less than 10. Because
10 sorties of an 18-h working day can hardly complete any
combat missions for a heavy aircraft carrier and it should
retreat from the battlefront in such situation.
From Figs. 20 and 21, it can be inferred that when the
incoming enemy's missiles are less than 16, the change rates of
these data are relatively mild; the sortie generation rate keeps
upon 110 and the probability of losing the operational capa-
bility is very small. Thus, the overall operational capability of
the aircraft carrier can hardly be weakened by less than 16
missiles. As the number of incoming missiles increases, the
data in Figs. 20 and 21 change roughly linearly and the decline
of the overall operational capability becomes obvious. By
contrast, the number of residual aircrafts in Fig. 19 decreases
much slower. When the number of incoming missiles increasesFig. 18. The change of the average of the damaged FPs with the different
number of incoming missiles.to 96, there are still about 29 aircrafts able to strike, while the
average sortie generation rate is only about 55 according to
Fig. 20. This shows that the main reason for the decline of the
sortie generation rate is the decrease of the service rates of
some service stations caused by some key aircraft guarantee
resources being hit by enemy's warheads, rather than the
decrease of the residual aircrafts. From Fig. 21, when the
enemy employs 128 anti-ship missiles to attack the aircraft
carrier, they have nearly half the chance to deprive the aircraft
carrier's operational capability, which means such anti-ship
firepower can effectively threaten the aircraft carrier. From
Fig. 18, it can be inferred that there is no need to destroy the
entire flight deck to destroy its working ability and just aFig. 21. The change of the frequency of losing the operational capability with
the different number of incoming missiles.
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the aircraft carrier's operational capability, since there are 80
FPs in total.
4.2.4. The possible ways to improve the survivability of the
flight deck
On the whole, less than 16 missiles can't do much essential
damage to the aircraft carrier's flight deck; if the enemy wants
to effectively weaken the aircraft carrier's operational capa-
bility, at least 64 missiles are needed; however, only more than
128 missiles may have the chance to totally destroy the aircraft
carrier's operational capability. The simulative calculation
result shows that even the enemy concentrates all the fire on
the flight deck, a heavy aircraft carrier within a strike group
still has stronger resistance to the anti-ship missiles than any
other kind of surface combat ships.
According to the calculation data, some key FPs or aircraft
guarantee resources being destroyed may cause the overall
operational capability significantly decline. Thus, the
following suggestions may help improve the flight deck's
resistance to the anti-ship missiles with cluster warheads:
1) When designing the general arrangement of the flight
deck, try to scatter the aircraft guarantee resources and
reduce the probability of them being damaged by the same
hit.
2) Improve the performance of some aircraft guarantee re-
sources. For example, employ the electromagnetic cata-
pults to replace the steam catapults and this will improve
the efficiency and maintainability of the catapult system.
3) Strengthen the maintenance force and increase the storage
of the spare parts. For example, increase the establishment
of the maintenance crews on the flight deck as well as the
relevant devices or increase the storage of spare arresting
wires.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, the simulative method to evaluate the aircraft
carrier's flight deck's resistance to the attack of the anti-ship
missiles with cluster warheads was presented. The result of
the case study shows that quite a bit of missiles are needed for
the enemy to penetrate through the 3 defense zones of the
strike group to effectively weaken the aircraft carrier's opera-
tional capability. On the other hand, for the aircraft carrier,
even only a little part of the flight deck is damaged, some
important aircraft guarantee resources are still possible to be
destroyed and this will cause the great decline of the opera-
tional capability.
This method may help analyze the sensibility and resistance
of the aircraft carrier's flight deck to the anti-ship weapons in
the conceptual design period and then provide some technical
support for designing the survivability of the aircraft carrier.
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